Chapter 1

The Making of Neoliberal Turkey:
An Introduction

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In the early summer of 2013, a momentous public protest took place in Istanbul, offering an invaluable source of information and perspectives on Turkish society in the neoliberal era. The event, which today is called the Gezi Park Protests, started as a small occupation in order to defend Gezi Park in the Istanbul’s city center from destruction by the government. The protests quickly snowballed into the biggest social protest that Turkey has seen since the 1970s, unleashing a massive social energy and producing one of the biggest laboratories for social dynamics in recent times. The Gezi Park Protests included massive demonstrations against the government’s recent policies and on and off occupation of the park space for several weeks, as well as brutal police violence against the protesters, occupiers and supporters. What was striking in the Gezi protests was the inability to define the protests through the existing academic frames. Protests were carried out by thousands of people with diverse political ideologies and socio-economic backgrounds. Even to this day, a satisfactory analysis of the protests is hard to find.

The protests initially appeared to pit the masses against a heavy-handed government. This certainly has a kernel of truth: indeed, while the protests were initially about the protection of the park space, they quickly evolved into a massive protest against the heavy-handed, top-down approach of the government. The reality, however, is a much more nuanced and complex picture in which we saw the struggle between different regimes of governmentalities. The Gezi protests, in other words, did not lend themselves to an easy reading that pits the society and the state against one another. Rather, these protests displayed the different regimes and mentalities of governing while such mentalities are striving for dominance against one another. A particularly salient form of such struggles took place during the protests against the governing ideology of the ruling party, which seemed determined to impose an Islamic, conservative, family-oriented, pro-natalist life style to the citizens. Such outright pressures included, for example, a ban on the sales of alcoholic beverages after 10 p.m., access limits to birth control and abortion, and leaving major urban venues of arts and culture dysfunctional and empty, to eventually crumble or be demolished. Against the type of neo-conservative Islamism that defined the government’s stance, a more generous and hands off liberality was championed.
by the protesting youth, putting the two competing programs of governing in present day Turkey on clear display.

In addition to such contours, however, there were also different currents of political experimentation that showed potential new forms of subject formation and governance. Within the physical borders of Gezi Park, a political space was quickly established in the immediate aftermath of the protesters’ takeover of the urban park. What started out as an environmental protest to protect an urban park, in other words, was quickly turned into a sphere of political experimentation in which a long yearned for democratic, inclusive, and deliberative style of politics was put on display. Such political experimentation positioned itself against the meticulous and intrusive governing style typical of the JDP government, but the other side of this same experimentation can also be found in the more traditional political party system of Turkey. This performative and discursive political arena indicated the existence of certain axes of resistance and subjectivity not only against the JDP rule, but also against the system of political representation altogether. Political groups which are quite different in terms of their political views and aspirations came together in a common act of resistance. Such common acts formed the grounds for the recognition of the other, as well as opening avenues for dialogue between previously distant communities. Social media channels and public meetings in neighborhood parks and open spaces played a crucial role in generating a rethinking of the governmentalized nation and the need to revise what citizens understand from power and demand from politics. The protests have also confirmed our insight that new perspectives in analyzing Turkish society and politics are needed. The more traditional frameworks on power and protest in Turkey fail to understand and explain the social phenomena today. That issues such as environment, urban space, and individual freedom became so important as to incite massive demonstrations proves, at least in part, that a new landscape of power is out there. *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey* is an attempt to chart that landscape and offer ways to make it legible.

Turkey has been neoliberalizing at least since the economic reforms that were declared on January 24, 1980. This book is about the process of neoliberalization of Turkey in the recent decades. Each chapter highlights a specific dimension of this process, and the chapters collectively offer a thorough examination of the whirlwind of changes Turkish society has undergone since the 1980s. Governmentality provides a distinct analytical lens through which to explicate neoliberal globalization in Turkey. The particular focus of the volume is on the novel ways that social power operates and the new identities and social forces that emerge alongside channels of resistance and reinterpretation. Hence, our claim is that such a sustained examination of the new axes of power and subjectivity with a particular eye on the formation of new political spaces of governance and resistance would deepen our analysis of Turkey’s experiment with neoliberal globalization. The opening up of new venues and the building of new discourses, such as environmentalism and feminism, the rise of identity
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politics and its discontents, and the reproduction of spaces for politics through, for example, the urban rights movements, are some of the key elements in this transformation.

Another key motivation in bringing together the interdisciplinary chapters in this volume is to question the primary role ascribed to the state in the critical accounts on politics and society in Turkey. All of the authors in The Making of Neoliberal Turkey resist the urge to explain social dynamics by constant references to the Turkish state, as frequently done in Turkish social science, especially in critiques of modernization (Bozdogan and Kasaba 1997; Heper and Sayari 2012). Governmentality, a concept developed by Michel Foucault (Burchell et al. 1991), is a useful departure point for an analysis that aims to have a healthy suspicion about the role and capacities of the state in Turkish society. Although not all the authors subscribe to an explicitly Foucauldian framework, they all agree that, not only have politics shifted over time (notably through neoliberalization), but our conceptual tools to understand and explain the domains of politics and society have also transmogrified. In this sense, through the incorporation of the dual concepts and process of neoliberalism–neoliberalization and governmentality–governmentalization provide us with a fresh analytical perspective as we facilitate a move away from state-centered analyses of Turkish society.

In this introductory chapter, we lay out the basic threads that connect the chapters in the coming pages. Initially, in the next section, we draw a bird’s eye view of the transformations in Turkish society and politics in recent decades. Next, we briefly discuss the established ways of thinking and understanding that characterize many, if not all, works on the Turkish sociopolitical scene, in an effort to explain what it is that we are offering with this book. This section leads to a theoretical excursus where we offer our take on governmentality and governmentalization as theoretical concepts and tools that could be mobilized for research in the context of neoliberalization in Turkey. Finally we offer an overview of the book, specifying what the chapters are about and how they connect to one another within the broader skeleton of the book.

A History of the Turkish Present

Turkey has been gradually opening up to the multiform flows of globalization and neoliberalism since the early 1980s. This opening has become more accentuated since the end of the Cold War, during which Turkey had been located as one of the frontier countries. As Fikret Senses explains in greater detail in his chapter, in the post-1980 years, the national economy was liberalized and articulated with world markets, while the import-substitution basis of the industry was mostly terminated amidst broad waves of privatization and deregulation. The political landscape that had been structured around the meta-narratives of the left and right in the pre-1980 period got fragmented to include identity issues, culture and
lifestyle choices as the new bases for politics. As military intervention heavily bulldozed over the pre-1980 axes of politics, unions and other labor associations were silenced and tamed by the military rule of the early 1980s and kept under control by the ensuing governments. Much like any other country experiencing neoliberal transformations, politics took on a bad name as if it were, by nature, equated with corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence. Under the neoliberal reforms, politics would be a technocratic endeavor: rational, sterile, and free from the messiness of ideology and ideological struggles. Accompanying this eradication of the “old” politics was the emergence of a “new” one focused on identity, locality, consumerism, and a celebratory rhetoric of free choice. Civil society was hailed as the ideal terrain of politics, while labor movements or political parties that aimed at capturing governmental power were discredited as outdated. At this juncture, a depoliticized understanding of social movements and non-governmental organizations became hegemonic, in accordance with technocratic understandings of how the state and society should be organized. While the pre-1980 forms of politics were still operative in the 1980s to a certain extent, as could be seen in the massive labor demonstrations of 1989 and the miner strikes in following years, such forms were eventually diminished by the fall of the Soviet Bloc, leaving the labor movement and politics severely damaged. The anti-politics machine that seemed more like a liberal and military fantasy at the beginning of the decade appeared to have become a reality by the end of it. If global factors and forces such as the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc were one part of the reason Turkey grew into this liberal fantasy, the mixing of culture and consumerism in order to produce consent for the emerging neoliberal doxa was another. Turkish culture adopted transnational tastes, brands, and values; and then blended them with various localisms that autonomously existed together in the cultural domain. While a number of monographs and edited volumes give an account for this transformation in the post-1980 term using different and significant theoretical approaches (Bozdogan and Kasaba 1997; Finkel and Sirman 1990; Heper and Sayari 2012; Oktem and Kerslake 2010; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Oktem 2011; Onis and Senses 2009; Ozyurek 2006), the lack of a focus on “culture” and the relatively rigid conceptualizations of hegemony with a strong emphasis on the economic dynamics leave further room for studies that examine the cultural domain and emphasize politics not only at the macro level but also at the very micro, capillary sites in of the everyday with a bottom up view of how power actually operates and circulates.

Just as this liberal fantasy started producing consent by the beginning of the 1990s, it was also dealt a serious blow. The fantasy itself was not lived by the majority of the population, but it commanded the power to mobilize desire and longing among the masses for a depoliticized form of politics. This false utopia was shattered by the increasingly violent and (by the early 1990s) chronic armed conflict between the Turkish army and the separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). A deep wave of confrontation, which the army defined as a “low intensity war,” not only left tens of thousands of people dead, but also led to the forced mass
migration of Kurdish citizens from the countryside to urban regions (Saracoglu 2010). At this juncture, the essential axis of the political landscape moved swiftly toward nationalism. Both Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms grew alongside each other, producing ethnic-based identities as significant movers of politics. Parallel to the move towards a politics of ethnicity was the rise of political Islam, partly due to the deliberate encouragement of Turkish-Islamic view in the post-coup 1980s (Tugal 2009). A line of post-1980 Islamic parties increasingly claimed an important segment of the popular vote. By 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) was elected to government, and has stayed in power since.

In fact, these broad changes in the political landscape followed a global pattern that is displayed in the “West” as well. As Lenz and Dallman put it (2007, 5), in the 1980s “a paradigm change [was experienced] from redistribution, a politics of structural difference, to recognition, a politics of cultural difference that focused on multiculturalist and feminist claims and notions of cultural group identities.” In Turkey, the broad remaking of the political landscape bore its fruit in the 1990s, with the shift from a politics of redistribution articulated with a left versus right scale toward a politics of recognition that emphasized identities, Islamist, Kurdish, secularist/Kemalist, and, of course, Turkish nationalist.

Such emergence of new or renewed identities and their recognition changed the entire political spectrum. The previous normal of Turkish politics, defined by an adherence to the ideals and practices of the Kemalist Republican model, a military to guard this adherence, and a strict avoidance of ethnicity and religion as the bases for political mobilization, have been shattered, leaving a wide open terrain for new forms of politics to flourish. In this renewed landscape, identity based social movements (such as feminist groups, LGBTQ activists, Kurdish associations, environmentalist organizations, and religious currents) have been politicized. It is also in this context that the currently ruling JDP has formed a discursive coalition with a number of secular/liberal groups using its democratic rhetoric, reaction against outdated state mechanisms, and promises to take steps towards European Union membership, which would signal an ultimately happy ending to the belated Turkish modernization.

We identify three essential dynamics that have facilitated the process of neoliberal governmentalization: First, the heavy military rule in the years following the coup of 1980 hammered out any type of political organization that had existed in the pre-1980 years. Second, financial liberalization and integration with global neoliberalism under the guardianship of the military have rendered Turkey vulnerable to the establishment of the rule of the market in almost all facets of life. In the absence of political webs that could provide organizational capabilities to the people for resistance, such intrusion of the market has been much more profound. Finally, these twin dynamics have been accompanied by a societal change that had already been well under way in Turkey. The consistent rise of the urban population from 1955 onwards and its surpassing of the rural population by the early 1980s have been key to understanding Turkish neoliberalism. Partly as a result of urbanization, middle class formation and consumerism have been in
the making for quite some time, even before the coup of 1980. Combined with
the tabula rasa that the military provided in the years immediately post-1980,
these already existing dynamics merged with the new ones to shift the Turkish
political landscape. We argue that these three dynamics opened up new spaces
and sites both for creative politics and governance of the masses in the post-1980
period. The proliferation of new identities and political positions on the one hand
enabled new forms and repertoires for progressive politics. But these emerging
forms and processes also are indicative of, and sometimes engender, new forms of
regulation and governance.

If the transformations of the 1980s can be seen as the building blocks of
the neoliberalization of a country, they were also accompanied by what Michel
Foucault (1991) calls, “governmentalization of the state and the nation.” By
governmentalization, he means the sidelining of the traditional axes of politics
and the emergence of new spaces and sites for both governance and resistance.

Governmentalization is used by Foucault to further explain his concept of
governmentality. He uses governmentality in order to designate the myriad ways
in which power operates in society. This is part of his attempt to understand
power not as a property to be owned or energy to be stored. Rather, Foucault
conceives of power as a relation, as produced as a form of relationality. He tries
to understand, not who has power and who executes it from top to bottom, but
rather how power operates and is produced at the very micro instances that we
can observe. Accordingly, power in modern society is not owned by and does not
emanate from a sovereign state that stands above the society but is produced and
applied in a variety of ways that go beyond and above the state. In this sense, the
state is a condensation, a point of concentration as it were, of multiple axes of
power in society. The following line from his lectures in College de France best
captures this line of thinking: “The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a
regime of multiple governmentalities” (cited in Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke
2010, 77).

New subjectivities have been constructed as neoliberal ideas are fostered
and proliferated through intensifying power relations and the increased social
investment to govern them. The production and administration of knowledge,
the creation of supposedly free subjects who are able to compete and succeed
in neoliberalism, and the rigid governance of actions are fused in this context.

Governmentalization, as incomplete and open-ended concept as it is, is useful in
a first stab at the enrichment of academic vocabulary for broadly analyzing the
shifted Turkish political landscape.

Taking off from such a starting point, the process of government in Turkey
became more diffused yet tangible; almost all domains of conduct among
people, groups, and institutions have been redefined and reordered, and a great
number of new laws have passed in a ceaseless procession of legal reforms.
Life itself has been reconfigured by legal, political, cultural, and symbolic
interventions. In due course, cities and urban spaces have been restructured,
identities and sociabilities have been intermixed, ideological affiliations and
political belongings have been reformatted, bodily capacities and somatic experiences have been rearranged, work and leisure have been transposed, and nature has become a site of unceasing conflict and contestation. In revealing these new axes of power and subjectivity, *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey* does not intend to swing to the other end of the pendulum by fully ignoring the state in the Turkish landscape of power, for this would significantly impair the accuracy and explanatory strength of our analysis. In fact, power in post-1980 Turkey has been multiplied and decentralized through capillaries of everyday life and the body on one hand, but it simultaneously has been unified under various state apparatuses and local governments as well. Particularly after the 1990s, which saw a procession of relatively weak coalition governments, the coming to power of the JDP in 2002 constituted a watershed. Since this date, we have seen a progressive solidification of state power and its capacity to reach into Turkish society. Of particular significance in this juncture is the increasing coalescence between the ruling party, JDP, and the state apparatus. Not only have technological developments allowed the state to be ever more intrusive in the long JDP decade, but also a de jure unification of the ruling party and the state apparatuses have made it possible to produce a social landscape in which ignoring the state became impossible.

State power has not decreased by any means, but has been rearranged in the period of global neoliberalism (Harvey 2007). While the neoliberal doctrine suggests otherwise, in reality neoliberal years have seen an increased state intervention into society virtually everywhere in the world. In the Turkish context too, almost every distinct field of knowledge (whether public or personal) has been described, planned, studied, and intruded upon in the greatest detail by a unified party-state machine. This heightened level of intrusion has not gone unchallenged: in fact, the governmentalization of the nation is a process filled with moments of resistance and opposition. The Turkey of the post-1980 years, the governmentalized nation that is, is a space of struggle in which citizens strive to protect their bodies, their lives, and their relations from incessant surveillance and inevitable intrusion by the empowered state. At the same time, Turkish citizens also endeavor to navigate and prevail in this social universe by learning the new rules of the game, incorporating the required qualities, and executing the most prudent strategies.

In this sense, we follow the lead of an earlier edited volume, *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey* (Kandiyoti and Saktanber 2002). This book is an important and timely collection of chapters that explore the changing Turkey from the 1980s onward by focusing on different perspectives of urbanization, new identities, and culture production. We follow this book’s broad methodology to analyze the Turkish society from bottom up by looking at the capillaries in which power operates, but we aim to do so by anchoring our analyses with the theoretical lens of governmentalization. Below we develop this concept to shed light on how our theoretical perspective is informed and how it differs from already existing frames to analyze Turkish neoliberalism.
Overview of the Book

Michel Foucault (1991) elaborated on the meaning of the term governmentality as a new form of imagining and exercising power in early modern European societies in relation to the emergence of two interdependent fields of knowledge: the economy and the population. Distinct bodies of social knowledge and their fields of analysis and expertise, “social” and “human” sciences, and their relation to the state’s need for detailed knowledge were at the heart of the transition to governmentality from preceding modes of power. In this sense, every individual and society as a whole, as well as citizens’ health, welfare, security, contentment, and efficiency were within the focus and attention of governing activity.

Foucault articulates how governmentality did not fully erase the other forms of power that preceded it, such as sovereignty and discipline. Instead, it maintained certain techniques and ways of thinking from these two types of power. Subjects began to be seen as sources to be watched, cared for, optimized, and reproduced. Social, economic, political, and demographic processes were intruded upon and rearranged for these purposes. Not immediately, but through a process, the earlier concept of state was governmentalized: Different state apparatuses were defined and absorbed into virtually all areas of life in order to establish the rules and technologies of governmentality. This critical perspective prioritizes specifically empirical, present-centered, spatially-focused ethnographic approaches. Accordingly, there is no single paradigm to problematize or expand; instead, each distinct context of governing practices and each unique setting of the relations of authority necessitates its own meticulous research in order to catch the exact workings of governmentality (Bratich, Packer, and McCarthy 2003; Brockling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, 1991; Dean 1999; Inda 2005; Nadesan 2011).

Understanding and decoding neoliberal governmentality concerns thoughts and ideas as they are situated and delimited in specific locations, programs, institutions, and applications for leading and shaping conduct. A capillary analysis that focuses on located and practical techniques is called an analytics of government (Dean 1999, 2007; Ciccarelli 2008). Chapters in *The Making of Neoliberal Turkey* seek to illuminate the contours of the governmentality program, which produces life and invents ways to govern it through new regimes of truth. The chapters all offer qualitative enquiries into the various new manifestations of power and politics in Turkish society. There are a number of central questions and issues in an analytics of government that fit the approaches in these chapters in different ways. These questions and elements of the analysis include, for example, problematization (naming, identifying, locating, and questioning governing activities); asking “how” questions (regarding the constitution of identities, the reshaping of conduct, and the particular techniques, languages, and forms of expertise used); assemblages (of heterogeneous, dynamic, and flexible techniques, practices, and rationalities); forms of visibility, transparency, and visualization; technologies of government (the means, procedures, tactics,
and technologies through which governmentality is achieved); knowledge of
government (kinds and pieces of knowledge and how knowledge is contingently
organized, calculated, used, and reproduced); and identity production (governing
certain types of individuals and collective identities while fostering specific
capacities, orientations, and actions). The chapters are connected via several
intertwining thematic themes, including, but not limited to, the construction
of neoliberal subjectivities (Erol, Ozbay, Turem); new actors in the shifting
structures of government (Goral, Goker, Kayaalp, Unalan); neoliberal political
economy (Aksoy, Kayaalp, Nuhrat, Senses, Turem); new institutional forms,
norms, and values of governmentality (Aksoy, Goker, Nuhrat, Sert and Yildiz,
Terzioglu, Unalan); identities and space (Goral, Ozbay, Sert and Yildiz); and
privatization (Erol, Kayaalp, Senses, Terzioglu).

The book opens with Fikret Senses’s detailed analysis of neoliberal economic
policies in Turkey since 1980. Senses provides a thorough assessment of these
policies, concluding that the neoliberal model has failed to fulfill its promises, and
suggests ways to solve the problems created by the model. After Senses’s overview,
we move on to a series of chapters that focus on the governing instruments of
laws and regulations and the subjectivities they create. Ziya Umut Turem’s
chapter investigates competition laws and the kind of competitive individual they
envision, focusing on the institutions and subjectivities of the new neoliberal
regime. Turem’s chapter aims to provide a bridge between the macro-level
institutional changes, such as the establishment of a Competition Authority and
the passage of competition laws, and micro-level transformations in the discourses
by which individuals govern their lives. Competition appears to be significant
for both levels, and Turem follows this concept to explore the intersections of
macroeconomic and micro-level transformations of governance in neoliberalism.
While Turem’s chapter emphasizes the economic aspect of governance, the chapter
by Deniz Senol Sert and Ugur Yildiz examines international migration. They
investigate the constructions of insider/outside and inclusion/exclusion categories
through state efforts to govern mobility, showing the system of uncertainty the
law creates as part of the logic of governance, and how, in turn, migrants find
ways to benefit from the uncertainties in the system. As the last example of this
theme, Yagmur Nuhrat’s chapter elaborates on the ethnographic study of the
anti-violence law, which aims to curtail hooliganism in football. Nuhrat argues
that the law results in the transformation of the subjectivities of football fans, as
well as the physical and emotional space around football. Nuhrat claims that the
antiviolence regulations strive to produce football as a sterile space of high-class
entertainment, highlighting the game as a capitalist endeavor more than anything
else. In this process, antiviolence legal measures benefit heavily from the power
of new surveillance techniques as well as the command of state-backed coercion,
offering an excellent example of how the neoliberal drive towards the rule of the
market intersects with new technologies of governing.

The outcomes of competing rationalities, the constitution of what is good,
appropriate, and responsible—in other words, ethics or morality—is also
inherent in definitions of governing. The question of ethics brings in the issue of reflexivity and self-government, which is to create autonomous, responsible, trustworthy, self-regulating individuals to be governed. Thus, personhood is but another significant constitutive element of government, as Dean (1999, 12) explains: “Government concerns not only practices of government but also practices of the self … Practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants, and lifestyles of individual and groups … that seeks to connect questions of government, politics, and administration to the space of bodies, lives, selves, and persons.” Following this departure, the second theme of this volume concerns subjectivities that are mostly shaped by identity politics of gender and ethnicity and played out against the background of urbanization. Cenk Ozbay’s chapter exemplifies the ethical aspect of governmentality with its analysis of a new urban male subjectivity: the desire to be autonomous and responsible subjects while remaining self-centered and apolitical in one’s aspirations. Ozbay’s study of very popular weekly comic magazines and graphic stories, which subtly knit together politics, intimate matters, and highs and lows of everyday life through the stories of four protagonists. Ozbay delineates these storylines and shows how these illustrated men can be read as unraveling examples of the construction of neoliberal masculinity in urban Turkey. He shows how political subjectivity, gender identity, and neoliberalism are deeply entrenched together and the desires, ambitions, dilemmas, fears, and failures of the comic’s protagonists reveal contours of the neoliberal person, who has been produced and proselytized by various governmental discourses in Turkey. From there, the book moves from gender to ethnicity with Ozgur Sevgi Goral’s chapter on Kurdish migrants in Istanbul. Based on her fieldwork in two peripheral neighborhoods of Istanbul, Goral investigates the “new forms of discrimination, new discourses of racism, new rhetoric of Turkish nationalisms and new discussions of urbanness” that migration enables. Following Goral’s chapter, Gulru Goker continues the theme of the “Kurdish question,” while bringing together the roles of gender and ethnicity in forming subjectivities. Using the statement, “Mothers won’t cry anymore,” which is associated with the democratic opening initiative of the government, as a starting point, she centers her chapter on the rhetoric of the crying mother to explore the links between gender, militarism, nationalism, and motherhood.

The following two chapters carry the issue of subjectivities and identities to the realm of bodies and health care and describe how bodies are governed through discursive practices and medical institutions. Within this theme of biopower, Aysecan Terzioglu’s chapter investigates the ties between globalization and the new health care regime in Turkey. Juxtaposing the growing medical tourism policies in Turkey with the debates on health care needs of irregular immigrants, she illustrates how these two trends interact with the existing problems and inequalities in health care and the conceptualizations and practices of medicine in Turkey. Maral Erol’s chapter continues the theme of health care with her
discussion of the links between neoliberal ideas of individualization and personal responsibility for maintaining health. She explicates the new health care regime through the example of menopause, arguing that the gendered discourse of personal responsibility obscures wider issues of social justice and the gendered labor of care.

To govern is to regulate, shape, direct, and control human action or conduct within the terms of rationality. Following classical social thought, particularly that of Max Weber and Michel Foucault, one can acknowledge the coexistence of different types of rationalities—ways of systematic thinking, calculating, defining, and organizing knowledge. Therefore, governing is also about setting the specific rationality behind certain governing practices, techniques, and subjects, as well as elaborating on them. In accord with these arguments, our book includes chapters focusing on a broad range of issues, from tobacco control to conceptions of menopause as a disease, which are subject to governing practices and techniques. For example, while Maral Erol describes the discursive shift in health care towards increased self-discipline and responsibility with the example of menopause in popular health care literature, Ebru Kayaalp explains the creation of new agents through the privatization of tobacco farming via the reconstruction of the contracts.

Our last theme relates to the governmentalization of nature, agriculture, and environment along with their relevant organizations and actors, by looking at other aspects of biopower. Although these chapters resemble the first thematic cluster in their reference to regulations and laws, they emphasize governing relations regarding non-human elements instead of the social world. Ebru Kayaalp’s chapter opens this theme with the agriculture-specific aspect of environment and governmentality. Using tobacco farming contracts as a point of departure, Kayaalp unfolds the transformation of farmers and crops in the process of privatization of TEKEL, the former government monopoly on tobacco. Zuhre Aksoy’s chapter follows Kayaalp with an analysis of the legal-institutional framework around genetically modified organisms (GMOs), as well as the arguments of opposing groups and calls for a more participatory governance approach that incorporates all actors. The chapter brings agriculture and environmental activism together in an evaluation of the discussions over GMOs. More broadly, Aksoy’s chapter shows how a new space of politics has been opened up in neoliberal times and how, in turn, new mentalities of rule and resistance have been formed within this novel space. This cluster of chapters, as well as the book, ends with Dilek Unalan’s significant and informative account of environmentalism in Turkey. Comprehending governmentality is the simultaneous endeavor of capturing and spelling out ideas and programs of governance in place and in time. In this regard, Dilek Unalan’s chapter captures this endeavor in the environmental regulations in Turkey, and how they change and are resisted over time. She investigates the regulations, actors, and power relations in the field of environmental governance and environmental
activism in Turkey through examples such as discussions around the concept of sustainability.

References


